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Canadian Targets 
The United States has not been alone in its 
attempt to reduce inflation by slowing mone-
tary growth, specifically by attempting to hit 
numerical targets for the growth ofthe money 
supply. At least several of  the major foreign 
central banks shifted to monetary-aggregate 
targeting within the past decade, especially 
after the adoption of flexible exchange rates 
in 1973. Canada's experience in particular 
deserves close scrutiny because of  the gen-
eral similarityoftheCanadian and u.S. finan-
cial structures. More importantly, Canada has 
been quite successful in reducing money 
(M-l) growth over time, yet it has lost ground 
against inflation in recent years. This article 
examines Canada's attempt to use money tar-
geting to contain inflation, and what its at-
tempt might mean for other countries. 
Choice of M-l 
The Bank of  Canada targets M-l (cash and 
non-interest bearing checking acounts) be-
cause of empirical evidenceshowinga fairly 
stable long-run relationship between M-l 
growth and nominalGNP growth. It has also 
favored that measure because of its generally 
predictable relationship to the level of short-
term interest rates. The Bank believed that, by 
operating on the demand for money through 
interest rates, it could influence the direction 
of M-l and (eventually) the growth of nom-
inal GNP. 
Prior to October 1979, the Federal Reserve 
also employed the Bank of  Canada's operat-
ing procedure of  using interest rates to control 
the money supply. (Since October 1979, the 
Federal Reserve of course has emphasized 
control over bank reserves, rather than inter-
est rates, as a means of achieving greater 
control over the monetary aggregates). The 
Bank of Canada chose its operating instru-
ment, however, because of a desire to avoid 
destabilizing fluctuations in interest rates.  In 
its view, increased interest-rate volatility 
could produce increased exchange-rate vola-
tility, which could then add to domestic infla-
tionary pressures-since a depreciated dollar 
(but not an appreciated dollar) wou  Id affect 
cost-of-living adjustments. Also, the Bank felt 
that interest-rate volatility could lead to 
higher risk premiums in long-term bond 
yields, which could then lead to a reduction 
in capital formation. 
limitation of targeting 
The Bank of  Canada initiated money-growth 
targeting in November 1975, when it set an 
annual target range of 10 to 15 percent for the 
M-1 aggregate. Sincethattime, it has lowered 
the target range on five separate occasions to 
the present range of  four-to-eight-percent an-
nual growth. The Bank has been largely suc-
cessful in reducing money growth over this 
period, and in fact has been able to hitthe 
midpoint of  the M-1  target quite closely 
(see chart). 
However, this pinpoint accuracy is some-
what deceiving, because the Bank of Canada 
will only revise monetary targets downward 
when the trend rate of M-1  growth has sta-
bilized near the midpointofthe currenttarget 
range. This practice may appear somewhat 
arbitrary, but it has the distinct advantage of 
reducing money growth carry-over from one 
target period to the next. This can arise if  the 
monetary authorities act aggressively near 
the end of  the target period to hit the numeri-
cal targets, thus producing inappropriate 
money growth at the beginning of  the subse-
quent target period. The money-growth spi 11-
over problem faces the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks who uniformly use the 
end of  each calendar year as the designated 
endpoint when setting growth targets. 
. More importantly, Canadian practice has dif-
fered from American practice because of  the 
Bank of  Canada's occasional shift in priorities 
from monetary targeti ng to exchange-rate tar-
geting. In other words, the Bank of  Canada 
sometimes has concentrated on stabilizing 
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interest-rate differential between Canadian 
and U.S. rates. In March 1982, for example, 
Canadian M-1  fell by 2.3 percent below the 
September 1980 base-period level, and it is 
now considerably below the four-to-eight-
percenttarget range. This reflects such factors 
as a four-percentage-point increase in Cana-
da's official discount rate over that period. 
Despite the occasional shift in emphasis from 
monetary to exchange-rate factors, the Bank 
of Canada has been largely successful in re-
ducing M-1  growth over the past half-dozen 
·years. Still, some critics believe that the 
Bank's emphasis on exchange-rate targets 
may have undermined public confidence in 
its overall monetary pol icy. 
Inflation and demand shift 
Despite the deceleration in money growth, 
however, Canadian inflation has actually 
accelerated in recent years. In  1981, for ex-
ample, the inflation rate hit 12.5 percent-
higher than in any year since 1971. The per-
sistence of high inflation thushas led to a 
torrent of criticism against the Bank of Cana-
da's policies. In this view, the Bank of Can-
ada's reduction in money growth -i  nstead of 
causing a decline in the inflation rate-
actually produced a systematic downward 
shift in the demand for money. 
According to this argument, the reduced 
money growth raised domestic interest rates 
to historically high levels, and this provided 
the impetus for banking innovations which 
permitted Canadian firms to economize on 
their transaction balances. Specifically, 
Canadian chartered (commercial) banks 
under certain conditions began automatical-
ly to transfer surplus demand deposits into 
overnight interest-bearing deposits. The pro-
I  iferation of such cash-management services 
reduced the need for transaction balances, 
so that previously estimated money-demand 
functions produced overestimates of the de-
mand for such balances. Thus, the Bank of 
Canada's monetary policy apparently was 
less restrictive than would be implied by the 
downward trend in M-1  growth: 
2 
The Bank of Canada recognized that the na-
tion's poor inflation performance may have 
reflected this factor, as well as other special 
factors such as the sharp rise in oi I prices 
during the 1970's. In its 1979 annual report, 
the central bank said, "Innovations in bC;1nk-
ing practices ... have contributed significantly 
to the relatively low rate of growth of M-l-a 
rate that understates the effective growth of 
M-1." Because of the growing use of cash-
management services by major Canadian 
corporations, "It appears in retrospect that 
monetary pol icy would have been better if 
there had been a more rapid reduction of  M-1 
growth rates during 1975 to 1977./1 
M-2 versus M-l 
In Canada, a different choice of monetary 
aggregate perhaps could have given a better 
indication of  the degree of monetary restraint. 
Indeed, Canadian M-2 growth has shown 
I  ittle, if  any, deceleration in the past six years, 
which may help explain the continued high 
inflation rate in that country. Moreover, the 
velocity of M-2 has remained fairly stable as 
compared to the upward trend in M-1 
velocity. 
These developments led critics to suggest that 
the Bank of Canada should have chosen the 
broader M-2 monetary aggregate, rather than 
M-1, in its monetary targeting. The central 
ba n  k'  s preference for M-1, at least in part, 
sterns from its desire to use interest rates as an 
operating instrument. In this regard, M-1 
growth is much more amenable to an inter-
est-rate targeting procedure than M-2, which 
incorporates a  wide range of interest-bearing 
deposits. 
Critics argued that the Bank of Canada could 
have imposed regulations to limit the growth 
of  M-2 -as, for example, Great Britain did by 
imposing restrictions on the growth of banks' 
interest-bearing eligible liabilities (IBER's). If 
for example, the growth of their IBER's ex-
ceeded a certain percentage each month, 
U.K. banks were required to place non-inter-
est bearing deposits with the Bank of  England. %Change 
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Whenever banks reached these official limits, 
they found it increasingly unprofitable to 
compete with other financial institutions for 
funds, producing disintermediation away 
from the banking system. However, this in 
turn contributed to a breakdown in the rela-
tionship between the inflation rate and U.K.'s 
broad monetary aggregate. 
lessons of Canadian experience 
High and volatile interest rates, coupled with 
advances in computer technology, have 
prompted Canadian banks to develop cash-
management services which allow firms to 
economize on transaction balances. In an 
analogous sense, the Federal Reserve found a 
similar downward shift in U.S. M-1  money 
demand as a consequence of an upsurge in 
cash-management services. Monetary con-
trol has become more difficult, however, be-
cause of these ongoing structural changes in 
the demand-deposit component of M-1. Sti II, 
both the Bank of Canada and the Federal 
Reserve remain firmly committed to mone-
tary-aggregate targeting, and to the control of 
M-1  in particular. 
Both central banks tend to believe that shifts 
in the (M-1) money-demand functi.on can be 
offset by adjustments in target-growth ranges. 
The Bank of  Canada noted one such factor 
when it lowered the M-1  target range to four-
to-eight percent in early 1981.lt  argued that a 
reduction in M-1 targets was warranted at that 
time because daily-interest savings accounts 
(included in M-2) had grown partly at the 
expense of balances previously held in 
household personal-checking accounts. 
Similarly, the U.s. probably also experienced 
a downward shift in M-1  demand in recent 
years because of  the increasing importance of 
money-market mutual funds (included in 
M-2) and other cash-management innova-
tions. Indeed, this is a major reason why the 
Federa I Reserve perm  itted M-1  growth to fa II 
below its target range last year, at a ti me when 
3 
.  M-2 growth slightly exceeded the upper 
boundary of its target range. 
The Canadian experience suggests the 
wisdom of looking at more than one money-
stock definition to gauge the tightness orease 
of monetary policy. In the 1975-81 period, 
the Bank of Canada's monetary policy was 
not nearly as restrictive as the deceleration in 
M-1  growth had indicated. By contrast, Cana-
dian M-2 growth showed little or no deceler-
ation over th is period -a  pattern consistent 
with the persistence of inflation. Further evi-
dencefavoring multiple aggregate targeting is 
supplied by the Bank of England's recent 
abandonment of  sterling M-3 as the sole 
indicator of monetary policy. This move was 
prompted by the failure of the chosen 
monetary indicator, sterling M-3, to track 
U.K. employment and output losses during 
the 1980-81 period.lfnothingelse, theCana-
dian and U.K. experiences suggest that the 
Federal Reserve should continue its policy of 
setting policy based on several monetary 
aggregates instead of relying on one money 
stock measure alone. 
In addition, the Canadian experience under-
mines the argument that incentives for finan-
cial innovation will disappear in this country 
as interest-rate ceilings are phased out, as 
they are scheduled to do under the terms of 
the Monetary Control Act  of 1980. In Canada, 
chartered-banks' deposit rates remained 
, freely competitive with money-market rates, 
and consequently the Canadians did not 
develop a market for repu rchase agreements 
as the Americans did. Nonetheless; Canada 
has experienced serious monetary-control 
problems arising from financial innovations. 
This suggests that financial innovations 
would have occurred-even in the absence 
of interest-rate ceilings-in U.s. financial 
markets, because of such factors as high 
interest rates and advances in computer 
technology. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
. Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves  ~ +  )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,597  7.1 
11,813  9.3 
6,091  16.1 
4,790  9.1 
383  1.7 
446  28.2 
150  f- 2.3 
1,045  f- 6.7 
194  0.5 
2,327  i- 8.1 
808  2.7 
14,133  17.4 
14,059  19.7 
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